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NOTES

BROTHER CAN YOU SPARE A DRUG: SHOULD THE
EXPERIMENTAL DRUG DISTRIBUTION
STANDARDS BE MODIFIED IN RESPONSE TO THE
NEEDS OF PERSONS WITH AIDS?
Hope, it is true, is about all an AIDS patient has to hold on to.
Sometimes, it is the hope that the terrible disease will miraculously
disappear through some holistic alternative to medicines-a hope,
unfortunately, that rarely if ever is realized since miracles, like lottery hits, work on long odds. Many patients, however, are counting
on some new drug, or an old one tailored to a new purpose, in
hopes that it will rid their bodies of the raging virus.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The spread of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)2
has become a devastating global health threat. In November 1987,
approximately 62,000 cases of AIDS were reported to the World
Health Organization from 127 countries.3 However, as of February
1990, more than 120,000 cases of AIDS have been reported in the
1. J. LANGONE, AIDS: THE FACTS 169-70 (1988).
2. Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome is caused by a virus which attacks the T-4 lymphocytes and enters the cells, incorporating itself into the genetic material. When an infection
enters the body, these cells are activated and the virus reproduces itself, killing the cell in
which it is housed, and releasing itself into the body to kill other cells. The consequence is a
diminished immune system which prevents the body from warding off disease and which paves
the way for a host of opportunistic infections to attack the body and ultimately lead to the
individual's death. See Birchfield, AIDS: The Legal Aspects of a Disease, 6 MED. LAw 407,
409 (1987); see also E. NICHOLS. MOBILIZING AGcANsT AIDS 190 (1989)(noting that research has centered on drugs that prevent viral replication and the infection of healthy cells).
3. See Mann, AIDS: A Global Perspective, 147 W. J. MED. 693 (1987).
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United States alone, and over half of these individuals have already
died as a result of the deadly syndrome. 4 To date, no cure has been
discovered, and most individuals who develop full-blown AIDS 5 are
destined to die within several years of diagnosis.'
Faced with the devastating effects of AIDS and armed with
more questions than answers, researchers are actively searching for
ways to treat and cure the deadly syndrome, 7 and many experimen4. According to statistics compiled by the United States Department of Health and
Human Services, Centers For Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia, approximately 121,645
cases of AIDS were reported in the United States as of February 1, 1990. Of this total,
119,540 (98.3 percent) occurred among adults and 2,055 (1.7 percent) among children less
than 13 years of age. Of the adults, 108,538 (90.8 percent) were men and 11,052 (9.2 percent)
were women. The mean age at diagnosis was 37.5 years. The overall mortality rate in the
United States was 55 percent at the time of reporting and greater than 90 percent 5 years
after diagnosis. Between 1 and 2 million more individuals in the United States are believed to
be infected with the causative agent, the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). CENTERS FOR
DISEASE

CONTROL,

U.S.

DEP'T. OF HEALTH

&

HUMAN SERV.,

HIV/AIDS

SURVEILLANCE

1-18

(Feb. 1990), reprinted in M. SANDE & P. VOLBERDING, THE MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF
AIDS 7 (2d ed. 1990).
Global epidemiological studies are equally alarming. World Health Organization (WHO)
studies indicate that since 1981, more than 220,000 cases of AIDS have been reported from
153 countries. However, because of underreporting in many developing countries due to the
lack of diagnostic equipment and health infrastructure needed to identify AIDS, WHO estimates that in reality more than 500,000 cases of AIDS have occurred worldwide in this period
with more than 300,000 deaths resulting from the deadly syndrome. T. Quinn, Global Epidemiology of HIV Infections, in M. SANDE & P. VOLBERDING, supra note 4, at 3.
5. Scientists have separated the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome into three distinct
phases. The first phase includes persons who have been infected with the HIV virus and who
exhibit laboratory evidence of the infection, but who do not exhibit symptoms of the virus.
Scientists have determined that the length of time from when a person is infected with the
virus and when symptoms develop can vary from several days to several years. The second
phase has been termed AIDS-related complex or "ARC". Persons with ARC experience a
variety of symptoms which are usually not immediately life-threatening including swollen
glands, loss of appetite, weight loss, weakness, night sweats, persistent coughing, diarrhea, oral
thrush (white deposits in the mouth caused by an overgrowth of yeast in the digestive tract),
and shingles (blotching and scaling of the skin). The third and final phase of the syndrome has
been classified as "full-blown" AIDS. Full-blown AIDS is characterized by acute immune
system disfunction and the onset of any of a number of life-threatening opportunistic infections
including forms of cancer, pneumonia and tuberculosis. See J. LANGONE, supra note 1, at 1016.
6. See Brodeur, AIDS: Continued Problems In Access To Health Care, 7 ST. Louis U.
PuB. L. REv. 55, 57-61 (1988) (noting that full-blown AIDS usually takes the sufferer's life
within two years of diagnosis).
7. See V. Gong, Facts and Fallacies: An AIDS Overview, in AIDS: FACTS AND ISSUES
(V. Gong & N. Rudnick eds. 1986) (noting that although an enormous amount of information
about AIDS has been collected, knowledge about the syndrome is rapidly evolving and diagnostic criteria must continually be reevaluated as new information on AIDS becomes available); see also J. SLAIF & J. BRUBAKER, THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 167 (1985) (noting that although a tremendous amount of information about AIDS has been learned in a few short
years, the medical community's knowledge of the AIDS virus is dwarfed by what is unknown).
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tal drugs for the treatment of AIDS have been developed or are currently being developed. 8 However, only one such drug,
azidothymidine (AZT), is currently approved for interstate marketing by the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 9 Unfortunately, many persons 0with AIDS cannot rely on AZT for the treatment of their illness.'
Based on the lack of FDA-approved drugs for the treatment of
AIDS, many persons suffering from the syndrome are desperately
seeking access to drugs which have been approved for experimental
testing on humans," but which have not satisfied the rigid safety and
effectiveness testing criteria of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA). 12 In marked similarity to the lobbying efforts of terminal cancer patients throughout the 1970's, i" advocates of persons
8. For a list of experimental drugs for the treatment of AIDS currently under investigation, see FOOD AND DRUG ADNNISTRATION, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, AIDS CLINICAL
TRIALS INFORMATION SERVICE CUSTOM DATABASE SEARCH

(1989) (on file at Hofstra Law

Review).
9. See E. NICHOLS, supra note 2, at 210; see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., HHS NEWS, October 26, 1989 (announcing that the FDA granted permission for the
distribution of AZT free of charge for use in treating children under the age of 13 who have
AIDS or are suffering from infection with the AIDS virus, and noting that AZT is the only
drug that has been shown to be effective in prolonging the lives of people with AIDS).
The FDA is the administrative agency which is responsible for assuring that unsafe or
ineffective drugs are not distributed in the marketplace. The FDA enforces the Congressional
legislation on access to new and experimental drugs as set out in the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Ac!, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1982). The FDA is organized within the Department of
Health and Human Services. Within the FDA, the Bureau of Drugs is responsible for the
development and distribution of experimental human drugs. See H. GRABOWSKI & J. VERNON,
THE REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: BALANCING THE BENEFITS AND RISKS 24-25 (1983).
10. See J. LANGONE, supra note 1, at 178. The FDA has continually emphasized that

although AZT may prolong the lives of some individuals with AIDS, the drug is not a cure for
the illness. Id. Studies also have shown that AZT is often effective only in the early stages of
the illness. In fact, federal researchers have found that AZT is most effective in people who
are infected with the HIV virus and whose immune system cells have been depleted, but who
show few or no AIDS symptoms. See Hilts, AIDS Drug's Maker Cuts Price By 20%, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 19, 1989, at Al, col. 1. Furthermore, studies have shown that AZT is often
intolerable by patients with AIDS due to serious side effects associated with the drug including
anemia, bone marrow suppression, nausea, headaches, muscle pain, and insomnia. See E.
NICHOLS, supra note 2, at 211.
11. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act requires that all new drugs undergo
clinical experimental testing on humans before they may be approved for marketing by the
FDA. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1987 & Supp. 1989).
12. Pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, no person may introduce or
deliver any new drug into interstate commerce unless an approval of a new drug application is
filed with the FDA with respect to that new drug, and the new drug application must contain
full reports of investigations which have been made to show that the drug is both safe and
effective for its intended use. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(b) (1987 & Supp. 1989).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979); People v. Privitera, 23
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with AIDS are striving for the recognition of a fundamental right to
obtain necessary experimental treatment and are urging the government to modify the experimental drug distribution system so as to
permit the distribution of potentially effective new drugs to AIDS
patients before they have completed the traditional clinical testing
requirements.' 4 In response to these lobbying efforts, the United
States has recently witnessed important regulatory changes which
have the potential to drastically increase accessibility to AIDS experimental drugs before they have met the traditional FDA testing
criteria. 15 In addition, further regulatory changes may soon be implemented which would make experimental drugs for the treatment
of AIDS available at an earlier stage of the clinical process than
ever before."
With the devastating acceleration of the spread of AIDS, and
the dim prospects for a cure in the immediate future, the issue of
accessibility to unapproved new drugs promises to be a heated legal
debate for years to come.17 Advocates of persons with AIDS and
other life-threatening illnesses will undoubtedly continue to rally for
the recognition of a fundamental right to choose unproven drugs and
for the need for greater and faster access to these unproven alternatives. 18 Opponents will denounce the existence of a constitutional
Cal. 3d 697, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, 591 P.2d 919 (1979). In both cases patients sought access to
an unapproved cancer drug, Laetrile.
14. See Hilts, How The AIDS Crisis Made Drug Regulators Speed Up, N.Y. Times,

Sept. 24, 1989, at D5, col. 1 (discussing the strong lobbying efforts of advocates of persons
with AIDS to compel the government to loosen the rigid rules on experimental drug distribu-

tion for dying patients); see also Complaint at 11-12, National Gay Rights Advocates v.
United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 87-CV-1735 Civ. (D.D.C. April 26,

1988). In this case, the plaintiffs attempted to force the FDA to release its hold on the distribution of promising experimental AIDS treatment. On April 26, 1988, the United States Dis-

trict Court for the District of Columbia granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment
and dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. The FDA has implemented
the administrative exhaustion requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act into its regulations which state that "any interested person may petition the Commissioner to issue, amend

or revoke a regulation or order to take or refrain from taking any other form of administrative
action, under the law administered by him." 21 C.F.R. § 10.25(a) (1987).

15. See infra notes 162-84 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 192-203 and accompanying text.
17. See Garrett, AIDS: Hope From Underground,Newsday, Dec. 11, 1989, at 3, col. 2

(Suffolk County ed.) (noting that "[tihe urgency of the [AIDS] epidemic, rage among people
with AIDS and the special rules promulgated in Washington to speed drug development en-

sure that discoveries offering even the slightest bit of hope will be found in unlikely places.").
18.

See Hilts, supra note 14 (discussing the arguments of advocates for and against

streamlined access to unapproved drugs for the treatment of AIDS).
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right to obtain unproven treatment and will continue to focus on the
risks associated with early distribution programs.19
Section II will provide a brief history of the development of the
drug regulatory laws in the United States and the purposes behind
the legislation.20 Section III will analyze the United States Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Rutherford,1 the first major
challenge regarding the application of the FDCA's safety and effectiveness testing requirements to drugs for the treatment of terminal
illnesses, in light of the special dilemma faced by persons with
AIDS. 22 Section IV will address the question left open by the Supreme Court in United States v. Rutherford: should a person with
AIDS have a fundamental right to obtain unapproved experimental
treatment? 23 Although many commentators on the subject have argued against the recognition of a fundamental right of access to unapproved treatment,24 this Note will espouse a contrary view and argue that the courts should recognize a fundamental right of terminal
patients to elect and obtain unapproved drugs.25 The Federal government, however, may still have a compelling interest in obstructing
access to these drugs before they are clinically proven to be safe for
their intended use. 26 However, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act may be unconstitutionally overbroad by preventing terminal patients with no treatment alternatives from gaining access to drugs
which have not met the rigid effectiveness testing requirements of
the FDCA. 27 Finally, Section V will discuss the recent regulatory
measures and new proposals aimed at streamlining necessary experimental drugs to persons with AIDS and how the regulatory changes
will balance the government's interest in protecting the public's
health and safety against the terminal patient's right to obtain necessary life-saving treatment.28
19. Id.
20. See infra notes 29 to 66 and accompanying text.
21.
22.
23.

442 U.S. 544 (1979).
See infra notes 67-110 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 111-61 and accompanying text.

24. For a list of commentaries arguing against the recognition of a fundamental right of
unapproved treatment, see infra note 68.

25.
recognize
26.
27.
28.

See infra notes 112-49 and accompanying text (discussing the need for the courts to
that the election of unapproved medical treatment is a fundamental right).
See infra notes 111-54 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 162-203 and accompanying text.
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DRUG REGULATION

The advent of drug regulation in the United States is a relatively new phenomenon, evolving slowly in the twentieth century
largely in response to a series of tragedies caused by inadequate
monitoring of drug manufacturing and distribution in this country.
In 1906, Congress passed the first Pure Food and Drug Act ("the
1906 Act").*9 This legislation was passed in large part in response to
the publication in that same year of Upton Sinclair's book, The Jungle,30 which graphically depicted the horrors of factory work in Chicago in the first years of the twentieth century.31 The 1906 Act was
a rather limited attempt at regulation due to the controlling influence of many different interest groups.3 2 The main function of the
1906 Act was to prevent the adulteration and mislabeling of drugs
listed in the two national formularies, United States Pharmacopoeia
and National Formulary.3
Pursuant to the 1906 Act, a drug was considered adulterated if
it deviated from the standards supplied by the national formularies
without admitting this fact on the label of the product, or if the
strength or purity of the drug fell below the standard or quality
under which the substance was marketed.34 A drug was deemed misbranded if it was sold under a false name, if it was sold in the package of a different drug, or if it failed to identify and quantify the
existence of specifically enumerated addicting substances such as
opium, morphine and cocaine.3 5 Under the 1906 Act, if a drug was
found to be adulterated or misbranded, the drug could be siezed by
the government and the manufacturer could be prosecuted.3 6
29. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, §§ 1-13, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938).
30. U. SINCLAIR, TIE JUNGLE (1905).
31. For example, Sinclair's book graphically depicted how a popular brand of lard was
found to contain the remains of workmen who had fallen into the cooking vats. See Young,
Social History of American Drug Legislation, reprinted in DRUGS IN OUR SOCIETY 223 (P.
Talalay ed. 1964) (noting that President Theodore Roosevelt supported the 1906 Act partly as
the result of Sinclair's publication); see also P. TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG RE3ULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 27-29 (1980) (discussing the impact The Jungle had on the
Pure Food and Drug Act).
32. Some of these influential interest groups included manufacturers and dealers of patent medicines and the Proprietary Association which represented dealers in proprietary
medicines. See Young, supra note 31, at 218-22.
33. The National Formularies were official listings of drugs manufactured in the United
States. P. TEMIN, supra note 31, at 24.
34. Id. at 30.
35. Id.
36. Id. However, under the 1906 Act, dealers in drugs were immunized from prosecution provided they received guarantees from their suppliers that the drugs complied with the
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However, the 1906 Act proved inefficient because it aimed only
customers with the true identity of the substance purproviding
at
chased; the Act failed to assure purchasers of the drugs' safety or
usefulness.3 7 Thus, the legislation forced drug manufacturers to use
caution when advertising their products, but had little effect in
and/or using ineffective, danpreventing consumers from purchasing
38
drugs.
lethal
even
or
gerous,
In 1938, the Pure Food and Drug Act was replaced by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) ("the 1938 Act"),39 this
time in response to another drug-related crisis-the Elixir
Sulfanilimide disaster of 1937.40 Rather than being limited to drugs
listed in the national formularies, the 1938 Act included all "products affecting bodily structure or function in the absence of disease"
and, for the first time, medical devices. 41 The 1938 Act also placed
greater restrictions on adulteration and misbranding. A drug was
deemed to be adulterated if it failed to list all ingredients and their
quantities, as well as directions for the drug's use and any necessary
warnings concerning any dangers associated with the drug's use.42
Additionally, the concept of misbranding was expanded to include a
determination of whether the drug was dangerous to one's health
when used in the dosage recommended on the label.4 3
requirements of the Act. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, § 9, 34 Stat. 768, 771
(repealed 1938).
37. See United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911). In Johnson, a shipper of an
alleged cancer remedy was charged with claiming on the label that it was effective in curing
cancer when, in fact, the drug was ineffective for that use. In speaking for the majority of the
court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes held that the 1906 Act required only that the labelling
regarding the identity of the contents of the substance not be misleading; it did not proscribe
drug manufacturers from making false or misleading claims regarding the drug's therapeutic
benefits. Id. at 497.
38. Id. at 497-98.
39. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, §§ 1-902, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1987 & Supp. 1989)).
40. The Elixir Sulfanilimide disaster occurred when Massengill Company, a respected
pharmaceutical manufacturer, decided to market a liquid form of sulfanilimide which had
previously been sold only in tablets and capsules. Although the company tested the substance
for appearance, fragrance, and flavor, it failed to test the product for toxicity. As a result, over
one hundred people, including many small children, died painful deaths after ingesting the
toxic substance. However, under the 1906 Act, the government could not prosecute Massengill
Company for causing the deaths; it could only fine the company for misbranding violations. In
fact, because of the leniency of the 1906 Act, Massengill Company was only required to pay a
fine of $26,100 for mislabeling the product. P. TEMIN, supra note 31, at 42.
41. Id. at 43.
42. Id.
43. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 502(j), 52 Stat. 1051 (1938)
(current version at 21 U.S.C. § 352(j) (Supp. 1990)) (stating that a drug is misbranded "if it
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However, the most important change brought about by the 1938
Act was the requirement that no drug could be distributed in interstate commerce unless an effective new drug application (NDA) had
been filed with the Secretary of Agriculture. 44 The new drug application had to describe the contents, the manufacturing procedures,
and the intended uses of the drug, and had to demonstrate that the
new drug was safe for its intended use. 45 The application automatically became effective sixty days after filing unless the Secretary rejected the application for any of a variety of reasons. 46 Additionally,
the 1938 Act authorized the Secretary to suspend an existing new
drug application for just cause,47 and to grant exemptions to the new
drug application requirements for drugs intended solely for investigational use by qualified experts in order to test the safety of the
is dangerous to health when used in the dosage, or with the frequency or duration prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof.").
44. The applicant for approval of a new drug was required to submit in full: (1) reports
of investigations as to the drug's safety; (2) a list of its components; (3) a statement of its
composition; (4) a description of methods, facilities, and controls used in its production; (5)
samples of the drug and its components; and (6) specimens of the drug's proposed labeling.
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 505(b), 52 Stat. 1052 (1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1987 & Supp. 1989)). The drug regulatory branch of the government went through a series of changes throughout the early part of this century. By the time
of the Great Depression in 1929, the regulatory activity of the drug market was well underway, first through the Bureau of Chemistry (which became the Food, Drug and Insecticide
Administration in 1927), and then through the Food and Drug Administration in 1931. Each
of these regulatory branches were part of the Department of Agriculture. However, it must be
noted that prior to the Great Depression, few medicinal drugs were on the market and, consequently, these regulatory branches were mainly involved in monitoring the food supply until
1938. See P. TBMIN, supra note 31, at 35.
45. The Elixir Sulfanilimide disaster was directly responsible for the addition of these
new provisions to the drug control legislation. In proposing the new provisions, Senator Copeland placed special emphasis on the fact that, under the 1906 Act, the only basis for seizure of
the toxic substance was the fortuitous fact that the substance was not in fact an "elixir" and,
consequently, was deemed misbranded and subject to seizure. In response to the elixir tragedy,
Senator Copeland introduced a bill which forbade the introduction into interstate commerce of
"any new drug. . . not generally recognized as safe for use under the conditions prescribed in
its labelling unless the packer of such drug holds a notice of finding by the Secretary that such
drug is not unsafe for use." Cavers, The Food, Drug,And Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History And Its Substantive Provisions, 6 LAw & CoNrTrMP. PROBS. 2, 20 (1939).
46. See M. SILVERMAeN & P. LEE, PILLS, PoLITICS, AND PROFIT 87 (1974) (noting that
justifiable reasons for refusing a new drug application included a determination that the drug
sponsor did not provide adequate evidence of the drug's safety). Additionally, under the 1938
FDCA, the Secretary could postpone action on a new drug application for 180 days from the
filing date if the Secretary determined and provided notice that more time was needed for
evaluation of the application. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 505(c), 52
Stat. 1052 (1938).
47. See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 505(h), 52 Stat. 1053 (1938).
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drug.4
Thus, the 1938 Act introduced a fundamental change to the
regulation of new drugs by empowering the FDA to determine which
drugs could enter the marketplace, as opposed to the free market
system which prevailed prior to the enactment of the new legislation."" In passing the 1906 Act, the legislature assumed that given
the necessary information on a new drug's contents, each consumer
50
could make his own choice as to whether or not to use the drug.
However, in implementing the 1938 legislation, Congress realized
that the public did not possess the necessary scientific expertise to
make an informed decision -regarding whether to use a new drug,
and for this reason, manufacturers of new drugs would henceforth be
required to assure the safety of their products before the new drugs
could enter the marketplace. 51
Although the 1938 Act did provide much needed governmental
control over the shipment of potentially dangerous new drugs, the
legislation still failed in one critical aspect; it allowed for the distribution of any drug which was shown to be safe, regardless of
52
whether the drug was actually effective for its intended purpose.
Consequently, critics of the 1938 Act feared that the new legislation
would allow manufacturers to ship safe but ineffective drugs to consumers, a practice which could cause seriously-ill individuals to elect
53
new ineffective drugs over proven effective alternatives.
In 1962, Congress responded to the flaws in the earlier legislation by passing the Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the 1938 Act
("the 1962 Amendments") .54 Congressional support for this legislative change was fueled by public dismay over yet another drug-related tragedy-this time the thalidomide disaster of the 1950's and
48. Id. at § 505(i).
49. See P. TEMNN, supra note 31, at 44 (explaining how the FDA would be in charge of
determining which new drugs could enter interstate commerce).
50. Id. at 45.
51. Id. However, the House Report on the 1938 FDCA emphasized that the new legislation aimed at improving the safety of self-medication. The Report stated: "The bill is not
intended to restrict in any way the availability of drugs for self-medication. On the contrary, it
is intended to make self-medication safer and more effective." H.R. REP. No. 2139, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1938), reprinted in P. TEMIN, supra note 31, at 45.
52. See, e.g., M. SILVERMAN & P. LEE, supra note 46, at 87 (noting that "the new law
did not require the drug maker to produce convincing evidence of efficacy.").
53. See id. at 87-88. (discussing the 1938 legislation).
54. Drug Amendments of 1962 (Kefauver-Harris Amendments), Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76
Stat. 780 (1962).
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60's. 55 The fundamental change brought about by the 1962 Amendments was the addition of an effectiveness testing requirement to the
1938 Act. 8 Under the 1962 Amendments, no new drug could be
shippied in interstate commerce unless the drug was proven to be
both safe and effective for its intended use.7 Furthermore, the proof
of effectiveness had to be supported by substantial evidence submitted by qualified experts with scientific training.5
55. Thalidomide was a German-manufactured drug used as a sedative for pregnant
women in Germany and many other European countries. The sponsor of Thalidomide had
submitted new drug applications for distribution of the product in this country on several occassions during the 1960's, but the FDA examiner at the time, Dr. Francis Kelsey, returned
the application each time because of insufficient information on the new drug. In the year prior
to the passage of the Kefauver-Harris Amendments, news spread detailing how the use of
Thalidomide was linked to the incidence in Europe of phocomelia-a condition where infants
are born with deformed or missing limbs. Although the drug was never approved for marketing
in the United States, the drug had been distributed by the manufacturer's American sponsor
to more than 1200 doctors in this country for experimental testing. As a result, a small outbreak of phocomelia occurred in the United States as well. See P. TEMIN, supra note 31, at
123-24; see also S. RaP. No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. Naws 2884, 2905 (views of Senators Kefauver, Carroll, Dodd, Hart, and
Long) (noting that the Thalidomide tragedy dramatically illustrated the need to give FDA
physicians adequate time to assess a drug's safety and effectiveness).
56. Pub. L. No. 87-781, §§ 102-04, 76 Stat. 780, 781-82 (1962) (current version at 21
U.S.C. § 355 (1987 & Supp. 1989)).
57. Id.; see also S. REP.No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprintedin 1962 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2884 (stating that a major purpose of the amendments to the 1938
FDCA was to require "the installation and maintenance of acceptable drug manufacturing
and control procedures and a premarketing showing that all new drugs are effective-as well
as safe-for their intended uses"). This report also notes that "[t]he Food and Drug Administration now requires, in determining whether a 'new drug' is safe, a showing as to the drug's
effectiveness where the drug is offered for use in the treatment of a life-threatening disease, or
where it appears that the 'new drug' will occasionally produce serious toxic or even lethal
effects so that only its usefulness would justify the risks involved in its use. In such cases, the
determination of safety is, in the light of the purposes of the new drug provisions, considered
by the Food and Drug Administration to be inseparable from consideration of the drug's effectiveness." Id. at 2891-92.
58. This substantial evidence could not consist of a collection of impressions from physicians in the course of clinical practice. This rigid requirement of scientific proof resulted from
the testimony of many notable physicians in hearings on the proposed 1962 Amendments who
argued that ordinary physicians in clinical practice were often incapable of adequately evaluating the efficacy of a new drug. See P. TEMIN, supra note 31, at 122-24; see also S. REP.No.
1744, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-17, reprintedin 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2884,

2890-93 (noting that "[i]n such a delicate area of medicine, the committee want[ed] to make
sure that safe new drugs become available for use by the medical profession so long as they are
supported as to effectiveness by a responsible body of opinion."). The "substantial evidence"
test was chosen over a more rigid standard in large measure because of intense pressure from
drug company representatives. These representatives argued that a more stringent standard of
review for efficacy of new drugs might deter new drug research and development since differences of opinion regarding a new drug's efficacy could prevent an effective new drug from
entering the marketplace. Hearings on H.R. 11581 and 11582 Before the House Committee
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The 1962 Amendments to the Act introduced other important
regulatory changes as well. The Amendments did away with the automatic approval of a new drug application after sixty days, requiring instead that the FDA take affirmative action in approving any
new drug application." Furthermore, a new drug sponsor had to apply for approval before it could begin to conduct clinical trials on an
investigational new drug. 0 Through the new Amendments, Congress
sought to prevent the occurrence of another drug-related crisis
caused by inefficient governmental control over the dispensement of
experimental drugs. 6 '
Today, the 1962 Amendments, requiring that all new drugs be
proven safe and effective for their intended use before interstate
shipment, remains at the forefront of the modern federal drug legislation. 2 Additionally, the FDA has promulgated detailed regulations
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 63, 236 (1962).

59. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) provides:
(1) Within one hundred and eighty days after the filing of an application under
subsection (b) of this section, or such additional period as may be agreed upon by
the Secretary and the applicant, the Secretary shall either (A) approve the application if he then finds that none of the grounds for denying
approval specified in subsection (d) of this section applies, or
(B) give the applicant notice of an opportunity for a hearing before the Secretary
under subsection (d) of this section on the question of whether such application is
approvable.
Id.; see also S. REP. No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-43, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2905-08 (views of Senators Kefauver, Carroll, Dodd, Hart, and Long)
(justifying the elimination of the sixty-day automatic approval on the need to avoid another
drug tragedy such as the thalidomide disaster and noting that "the medical officers of the
FDA, who are trying to protect the American people from drugs with dangerous side effects,
should have an adequate time period in which to assure themselves that the drug is safe, and
that applications should not become effective automatically during any time period.").
60. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a) provides that "[a] sponsor who intends to conduct a clinical
investigation subject to this part shall submit an 'Investigational New Drug Application'
(IND)." Before this IND application is approved, the ssonsor must provide adequate information about pharmacological and toxicological studies of the drug which have been performed
on laboratory animals which tend to show that the drug is safe for testing on human subjects.
21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(8) (1989).
61. 108 CONG. REc. 17,398 (1962) (remarks of Senator Carroll) (calling attention to
the recent Thalidomide catastrophe and the need to enact regulations that will protect the
public against unsafe experimental drugs).
62. The new drug application requirements provide in pertinent part:
(a) Necessity of effective approval of application
No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any
new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to subsection (b) or (j)
of this section is effective with respect to such drug.
(b) Filing application; contents
(1) Any person may file with the Secretary an application with respect to any drug
subject to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section. Such person shall submit
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controlling the clinical testing of unapproved experimental drugs.6 3
Pursuant to the FDA's investigational new drug (IND) regulations,
a drug sponsor who wishes to conduct clinical testing of a new drug
is required to submit an IND application to the FDA. 4 The IND
application must contain detailed information regarding the identity
of the sponsor in charge of the new drug testing, the overall plan for
clinical evaluation of the drug, and specific information concerning
each phase of the clinical investigation process. 6 5 Additionally, the
FDA requires a commitment that the investigational drug sponsor
will not begin clinical investigations of the drug until the FDA approves the IND application. 6 Thus, through rigid control over the
distribution and clinical testing of new drugs, the modern FDA regulations aim at preventing any reoccurrence of the drug-related catasto the Secretary as a part of the application (A) full reports of investigations which
have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such
drug is effective in use; (B) a full list of the articles used as components of such
drug; (C) a full statement of the composition of such drug; (D) a full description of
the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture,
processing, and packing of such drug; (E) such samples of such drug and of the
articles used as components thereof as the Secretary may require; and (F) specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such drug ....
21 U.S.C. § 355 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
63. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.40 (1989) (regulating the use of an investigational drug in a
clinical test).
64. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(1989) (providing that "[a] sponsor who intends to conduct a
clinical investigation subject to this part shall submit an 'Investigational New Drug Application' (IND) including in the following order: (1) [A] [clover sheet [for the application] ...
(2) A table of contents (3) [An] filntroductory statement and general investigational
plan. . .

."

(italics in the original)).

65. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(1) (1989). This section provides, in relevant part, that the
cover sheet of the investigational new drug application must include:
(i) The name, address, and telephone number of the sponsor, the date of the application, and the name of the investigational new drug.
(ii) Identification of the phase or phases of the clinical investigation to be
conducted.
(iii) A commitment not to begin clinical investigations until an IND covering the
investigation is in effect.
(iv) A commitment that an Institutional Review Board (IRB) . . . will be responsible for the initial and continuing review and approval of each of the studies in the
proposed clinical investigation and that the investigator will report to the IRB proposed changes in the research activity ...
(v) A commitment to conduct the investigation in accordance with all other applicable regulatory requirements.
(vi) The name and title of the person responsible for monitoring the conduct and
the progress of the clinical investigations . ...
Id.
66. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(iii)(1989). This section requires a commitment not to begin
clinical investigations until an IND covering the investigation is in effect. Id.
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trophes which shattered the public's faith in the drug industry

throughout this century.
III.

RUTHERFORD REVISITED IN THE ERA OF

AIDS

Although few cases involving access to unapproved drugs for the
treatment of AIDS have come before the courts to date,67 this situation is certain to change as more and more individuals are diagnosed
with AIDS and find themselves with few, if any, alternative methods
of treatment for their AIDS-related illnesses. Scholars have debated

whether the rigid FDCA safety and effectiveness testing criteria
should apply without modification to drugs for the treatment of ter-

minal illnesses and whether a terminal patient has a constitutional
right to obtain unapproved treatment.0 8 There has been a lack of
legal debate concerning the application of the experimental drug distribution standards, however, in the context-of the AIDS pandemic.68
The subject of access to unapproved experimental drugs re-

quires a special analysis in the context of AIDS due to special fac67. See, e.g., National Gay Rights Advocates v. United States Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., No. 87-1735 Civ. (D.D.C. April 26, 1988) (plaintiffs brought an action to force
the FDA to release its hold on AIDS experimental drugs). The FDA has jurisdiction to determine if a drug is a new drug in the first instance. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 627 (1973). Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, the
FDA's determination may be reviewed by a district court. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976). For
the district court to overturn the FDA's initial determination, it must find that the administrative determination is "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion." Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Wolpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
68. See, e.g., Leitner, Laetrile and the Law: An Analysis of Rutherford v. United
States, 5 OKLA.CITY U. L. REV. 11 (1980) (arguing that the right of privacy does not include
a terminal cancer patient's right to obtain an unapproved drug); Comment, Laetrile: Supreme
Court Upholds FDA "New Drug" Classification;Still No ConstitutionalRight of Access to
Unapproved Drugs, 3 DET. C.L. REV. 871, 883-4 (1980) (authored Catherine J. Brown) (arguing that there is no fundamental right to choose medical treatment with an unapproved drug
and that the right of privacy does not guarantee access to medical treatment); Comment, Picking Your Poison" The Drug Efficacy Requirement and the Right of Privacy, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 577, 617 (1978) (authored by Don G. Rushing) (arguing that the states' interest in
protecting the patient from ineffective drugs is sufficiently important to offset the individual's
interest in "picking his own poison"). But see Comment, The Right to Choose An Unproven
Method of Treatment, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 227, 245 (1979) (authored by V. Anthony Unan)
(arguing that the right to choose an unapproved treatment should be constitutionally
protected).
69. Only one commentary has addressed the right to obtain unapproved treatment in the
context of the AIDS pandemic. See Comment, The Right of Privacy in Choosing Medical
Treatment: Should Terminally Ill Persons Have Access to Drugs Not Yet Approved By The
Food and Drug Administration? 20 J. MARSHALL L. REv.693, 714 (1987) (authored by Scott
H. Power) (arguing that the terminally ill, including persons with AIDS, have a constitutional
right to obtain unapproved treatment).
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tors which differentiate the plight of persons with AIDS from that of
individuals with other life-threatening illnesses. Specifically, the
complete lack of any cure for AIDS and the critical scarcity of
FDA-approved drugs to treat the syndrome70 requires a rethinking
of whether the FDCA's rigid safety and effectiveness requirements
should apply without modification in the case of a terminal AIDS
patient seeking access to an unapproved drug. 7 ' In United States v.
Rutherford,7 2 the United States Supreme Court held that the
FDCA's safety and effectiveness testing requirements applied without exception to drugs used to treat the terminally ill. However, in
light of the scarcity of treatment alternatives for persons with AIDS,
it is important to re-analyze the Rutherford decision and determine
whether it should be extended without modification to a person afflicted with AIDS who has no approved medical alternatives.
United States v. Rutherford commenced when a group of terminally-ill cancer patients brought a class action to enjoin the government from interfering with the interstate shipment of Laetrile, a
cancer drug which had not been approved for distribution under the
FDCA.7 3 The class challenged an earlier administrative decision by
the FDA which ruled that Laetrile was a new drug within the meaning of the FDCA and, as a result, could not be placed in interstate
shipment until a new drug application was filed on its behalf.7 4 The
class based its argument on several grounds, including, inter alia,
that the drug was not a new drug within the meaning of the FDCA,
that the drug fell within a grandfather clause in the FDCA, and that
terminal cancer patients have a fundamental right, incident to the
right of privacy, to choose an unapproved drug for the treatment of
their illness.7 5 The District Court ruled that Laetrile was exempted
from premarketing approval under the 1962 FDCA's grandfather
clause.7 Additionally, the Court noted that the Commissioner of the
FDA may have infringed on a constitutionally protected right, incident to the right of privacy, by denying the cancer patients the abil70. See M. SANDE & P. VOLBERDING, supra note 4, at xiii (noting that the outlook in
the near future for curative treatment or an effective vaccine to combat AIDS is grim).
71. See J. LANGONE, supra note 1 (discussing the absence of a cure for AIDS and the
scarcity of therapeutic alternatives approved by the FDA).
72. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
73. Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla. 1977), afr'd, 582 F.2d
1234 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S 544 (1979).
74. Rutherford, 438 F. Supp. at 1289.
75. Id. at 1289-92.
76. Id. at 1294-98.
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ity to obtain the unapproved drug."
On appeal, the court of appeals did not address the constitutional or statutory bases of the lower court's decision. Instead, the
court held that the safety and effectiveness requirements of the
FDCA have no reasonable application to terminally-ill cancer patients. 78 In support of its decision, the court reasoned that the safety
and effectiveness standard bore little weight if the patient was going
to die "regardless of what may be done." 79 Additionally, the court
emphasized that there was no reasonable standard against which to
measure the safety and effectiveness of a drug for the treatment of a
terminal illness and, consequently, that the standard could not be
applied in the case of a terminal patient.8 0
However, in 1979, the Supreme Court reviewed the lower
court's decision and addressed for the first time the issue of accessibility to unapproved drugs.8l In unanimously overruling the lower
court's decision, the Court held that the FDCA makes no express
exemptions for drugs used by the terminally ill.82 Moreover, the
Court determined that an implied exemption was unnecessary in the
case of drugs to treat terminal cancer to fulfill Congress' objectives
in implementing the drug regulatory laws or to avert an unreasonable reading of the terms "safe" and "effective" in the legislation.83
However, a careful study of the legislative history behind the FDCA
and a re-analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in light of the
AIDS pandemic requires that the Rutherford ruling be limited to
the question of access to experimental treatment for terminal patients where alternative approved methods are available. A modification of the FDCA testing criteria should be required when dealing
with questions of access to drugs for terminal illnesses, such as
AIDS, where there are often no treatment alternatives available.
In rendering its decision in Rutherford, the Supreme Court focused on the legislative history behind the 1938 Act which first established the safety testing requirement for new drug approval, and
the 1962 Amendments, which added the effectiveness testing re77.
78.
U.S. 544
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1298-1301.
See Rutherford v. United States, 582 F.2d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442
(1979).
Id.
Id.
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
Id. at 551.
Id. at 552.
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quirement 4 The Court noted that in deliberations before the passage of the 1938 Act, Congress was concerned with the need to protect all persons, including individuals with terminal illnesses, from
sham remedies. 85 Additionally, the Court noted that in deliberations
before the passage of the 1962 Amendments, Congress referred to
the need to apply the safety and effectiveness criteria to all drugs,
88
including drugs for the treatment of terminal illnesses.
In justifying the application of the safety testing requirement to
drugs for the treatment of terminal illnesses, the Court determined.
that the safety testing requirement applied to all drugs, including
drugs for the treatment of terminal illnesses, because any drug is
unsafe "if its potential for inflicting death or physical injury is not
'87
offset by the possibility of therapeutic benefits.
However, in justifying the need to apply the effectiveness testing
requirement to drugs for the treatment of terminal illnesses, the
Court noted that the effectiveness testing requirement was added to
the 1962 Amendments to assure that sick individuals would not elect
to forego conventional proven drugs over ineffective unproven alternatives. 8 The Court noted that "[a]n otherwise harmless drug can
be dangerous to any patient if it does not produce its purported therapeutic effect. But if an individual suffering from a potentially fatal
disease rejects conventional therapy in favor of a drug with no demonstrable curative properties, the consequences
can be
8
'
9
irreversible."
An analysis of the legislative history behind the FDCA suggests
that the Supreme Court's decision in Rutherford, regarding the application of the safety testing requirement, is consistent when confronted with the issue of experimental drug access for persons with
84. Id.
85.

Id. (citing 79 CONG. REc. 5023 (1935) (remarks of Senator Copeland) and 83

CONG. Rac. 7786-87 (1938) (remarks of Representatives Phillips and Lea)).
86.

Id. at 553 (citing 108 CONG. REc. 17399-401 (1962)

(remarks of Senator

Kefauver)) (discussing the application of the safety and effectiveness requirement for terminal
patients and the problems with rigid informed consent requirements in such circumstances)
and (remarks of Senator Eastland) (discussing the need to apply the requirements to patients
with life-threatening conditions and the problems associated with informed consent).
87. Id. at 556.

88. Id.
89.

Id. The United States Supreme Court emphasized that with diseases such as cancer

it is often only possible to diagnose a patient as critically ill in retrospect, and that many
critically ill cancer patients have had unexpected remissions and have responded to conventional treatment. Consequently, the Court held that exempting drugs with no proved effective-

ness from the FDCA's safety and effectiveness requirements could lead to "needless death and
suffering" among patients who might respond to legitimate approved therapy. Id. at 557.
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AIDS. In Rutherford, the Supreme Court aptly noted that one of
the main purposes behind the safety testing requirement of the
FDCA was the concern that individuals be protected against potentially dangerous or even lethal substances.9 0 In fact, in urging the
passage of the 1938 FDCA with the new safety testing requirement,
the FDA introduced what they coined the "Chamber of Horrors," a
series of pictures, labels and advertisements of harmful and even potentially lethal substances which, under the existing law, could not
be proscribed.9 1 Additionally, the legislative history indicates that
the Elixir Sulfanilimide disaster led to the addition of the new safety
testing requirement for new drugs.9 2 Under the pre-existing 1906
Act, the only basis for removing the lethal drug Sulfanilimide from
the market was the fact that it was mislabeled as an "elixir" which
applied only to alcoholic solutions. 93 Absent this fortuitous circumstance, the FDA would not have had authority to remove the substance from the marketplace. 94 Thus, the safety testing requirement
assured that no new drug could enter the marketplace until clinical
testing was conducted which proved that the drug was not dangerous
or lethal when used for its intended purpose.
In the context of AIDS, the need to deter reliance on potentially
dangerous or lethal substances remains equally strong since the near
absence of approved drugs for the treatment of the syndrome has led
many AIDS sufferers to resort to a host of unconventional and potentially hazardous remedies.9 5 For example, in response to the
desperation of persons with AIDS, many underground networks have
developed throughout the nation to distribute AIDS drugs from foreign countries." Other advocates of persons with the illness have
90. See Cavers, supra note 45, at 16 (noting that the safety requirement was added due
to the lack of protections afforded by the mislabeling and adulteration provisions of the 1906
Act).
91. Id. at 8. For example, "Banbar," an extract of the horsetail weed, had been marketed even though it was found to be deadly if used by a diabetic in place of insulin. Id. at 16.
92. Id. at 20 (discussing the influence that the elixir disaster had on the addition of the

safety testing requirement to the Food and Drug Act).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. For example, a recent controversy has arisen over the clandestine private study of an
unapproved experimental AIDS drug called "Compound Q," a drug derived from Chinese
cucumber roots, which was purported to have a remarkable ability in the test tube to kill cells
infected with the AIDS virus, but to leave healthy cells alone. The study, which was neither
government sponsored nor government endorsed, was intended to remain secret, but was
widely publicized when several patients died after taking the experimental drug. See Kolata,
Critics Fault Secret Effort to Test Aids Drug, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1989, at Cl, col. 5.
96. See Waters, Obtaining Experimental Drugs For Severely Ill Clients: The Dilemma
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formed self-treatment centers, also known as "guerrilla clinics,"

where instead of waiting for new drugs to become available through
the traditional clinical testing process, they have created a variety of
homemade treatments.9 7 The absence of approved drugs has led
other persons with AIDS to spend enormous amounts of money to
travel to foreign countries in order to obtain access to experimental
drugs which are either not available in the United States or are only
available in clinical trials to which the patients cannot gain
admittance.98
Thus, the safety testing requirement should be maintained when
dealing with the issue of accessibility of unapproved drugs for the
treatment of AIDS. The safety requirement will serve to prevent individuals with AIDS, faced with the pain and urgency brought about
by the lack of approved alternatives, from falling prey to persons
selling untested cures which could be dangerous, if not lethal. Applying the rationale for the safety requirement supplied by the Supreme
Court in Rutherford, even an unapproved drug for the treatment of
AIDS, a life threatening illness for which there are few available
alternatives, may be dangerous if "the possibility for inflicting death
or physical injury is not offset by the possibility of therapeutic benefits." 99 Accordingly, the safety requirement must be applied in the
Caused By AIDS, FLA. B. J., May 1989, at 7 (describing the emergence of such underground
networks and noting also that AIDS sufferers have even resorted to begging the relatives of
victims of AIDS to give them left over experimental drugs).
97. See Bishop, Desperate Lives, Unknown Risks, CAL LAW., Sept. 1987, at 45, 46
(recounting how a host of "guerilla clinics" have developed self-made treatments out of egg

yolks, hand lotions, and other household products, and how one particular clinic in San Francisco was treating AIDS patients with a mixture of hand lotion and a chemical used in

photoprocessing that irritates the skin, but has been found to have some beneficial reaction
with the immune system).

98. See Waters, supra note 96, at 10 n.5. The author discusses the high incidence of
travel by AIDS sufferers to Mexico and other foreign countries in order to gain access to non-

FDA approved experimental drugs, as well as the emergence of a flourishing black market for
experimental drugs smuggled into this country from abroad. Additionally, the author notes

that the most famous case of such travel was the recent pilgrimage of the late actor, Rock
Hudson, to the Institut Pasteur in Paris to obtain the experimental drug, HPA-23. Id. Access
to AIDS drugs is extremely limited in that the experimental drugs are distributed in clinical

trials where researchers are focusing on studying the effects of the drug on one type of group
whom they think the drug might help. These clinical trials are often geographically restricting

since they are most often found in large urban research hospitals or medical centers. See US.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs.. AIDS CLINICAL TRIALS: TALKING IT OVER 6-7 (1989).
99.

See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 556 (1979) (arguing that "[a]n

otherwise harmless drug can be dangerous to any patient if it does not produce its purported
therapeutic effects .

. .

. But if an individual suffering from a potentially fatal disease rejects

conventional therapy in favor of a drug with no demonstrable curative properties the consequences can be irreversible.") (emphasis added).
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context of AIDS in order to assure that drugs which have not met
minimal safety tests are not made available where these drugs could
inflict added pain or lead to a speedier death.
However, the Supreme Court's rationale in Rutherford for application of the rigid effectiveness testing standard to drugs for the
treatment of terminal illnesses falls short in many ways when confronted with the new problems faced by individuals with AIDS seeking access to unapproved treatment. In Rutherford, the Court emphasized that the purpose behind the addition of the effectiveness
standard in the 1962 Amendments was to assure that individuals did
not elect unapproved drugs over proven effective alternatives. 00
However, in the context of the treatment of AIDS, the Court's rationale only applies if the person with AIDS can utilize the only approved AIDS drug, AZT, or if the individual can gain access to any
of the investigational drug clinical trials. If the individual cannot tolerate AZT due to its serious side effects,1 0 1 and cannot gain access to
a clinical trial, 0 2 the Supreme Court's rationale for the rigid effectiveness requirement quickly loses force.
In fact, in expressing doubt over the application of the rigid effectiveness requirement for drugs for the treatment of terminal illnesses, the court of appeals in Rutherford discredited the FDA's assertion that a drug offered for use in treating a life-threatening
disease that is deemed to be not effective is therefore not safe. 0 3 The
court of appeals noted that the FDA's assertion "may lose its force
in the case of a terminally-ill patient or in the case of a patient suffering from a disease for which there are in fact no 'effective' remedies." 104 Thus, the court of appeals' decision implies that the effectiveness standard could be separated from the safety standard when
deciding whether to allow access to an unapproved drug for the
treatment of a terminal disease or a disease for which there is a lack
100. Id. at 556 (noting that "[a]n otherwise harmless drug can be dangerous to any
patient if it does not produce its purported therapeutic effect." (citing 107 CONG. REc. 5640
(1961) (remarks of Senator Kefauver))).
101. See supra note 10 (discussing the fact that AZT, the only currently approved
AIDS drug, is not a cure and often causes serious side effects which makes the drug intolerable by many AIDS sufferers).
102. See supra note 98 (noting that traditional clinical trials are limited to specific study
groups and are limited geographically as well and, as a result, are not accessible to all individuals with the illness).
103. See Rutherford v. United States, 582 F.2d 1234, 1236 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442

U.S. 544 (1979).
104.

Id.
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of treatment alternatives. 1 05 Accordingly, the strict effectivess testing

requirement should be modified in releasing unapproved drugs to
AIDS patients who cannot tolerate the only approved drug, AZT,
and who cannot gain access to traditional clinical trials.
However, the Supreme Court appears to have taken the special
dilemma faced by terminal patients and patients with diseases for
which there are few if any treatment alternatives into account in
rendering its decision in Rutherford. Although the Court upheld the
application of the FDCA testing requirement to drugs for the treatment of terminal illnesses, the Court noted that this did not foreclose
all resort to drugs which had not completed the safety and effectiveness testing process.' 08 The Court specifically noted that the FDCA
empowers the FDA to enact specific provisions for carefully regulated use of certain investigational drugs which have not yet been
demonstrated as safe and effective.10 7 The existence of this regula-

tory alternative reinforced the Court's decision that no exception
should be judicially implied for drugs to treat terminal illnesses.10 8
Thus, the Court appears to have implied that the rigid safety and
effectiveness standards could be modified in the case of certain terminal illnesses, but that this was an activity which had to be decided
and implemented by the FDA rather than the judiciary.
Recently, in large measure sparked by the desperation of patients with AIDS, the FDA has, in fact, enacted a new regulatory
program which allows some patients with life-threatening and serious illnesses to obtain experimental drugs before they have satisfied
the traditional testing criteria. 109 Indeed, the detailed analysis of the
recent experimental drug regulatory changes in Section V of this
Note will suggest that the FDA has recognized the need for modification of the drug testing standards in light of the urgency and
desperation caused by the AIDS pandemic. 110

105. Id.
106. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 558 (1979).
107. Id. at 558-59 (noting that § 505(e) of the 1962 FDCA [currently at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(i)] provides the Secretary of the FDA with the authority to promulgate regulations for
exempting from the safety and effetiveness requirements certain drugs to be used solely for
investigations by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to investigate the safety
and effectiveness of the drugs).
108. Id. at 558-59.
109. See infra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 192-203 and accompanying text.
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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT?

Scholars have long debated whether terminal patients have a
constitutional right, incident to the right of privacy, to obtain necessary medical treatment.11 1 Contrary to the views of most of these
commentators, the right to obtain necessary medical treatment
should be deemed fundamental. Additionally, for those individuals
with AIDS who cannot tolerate AZT and who do not have access to

other approved treatment alternatives, the government should not
have a compelling interest in restricting access to drugs which have
not fully completed the traditional clinical testing requirements of
the FDCA.
The Constitution of the United States does not explicitly recognize any right of privacy. 12 However, throughout this century, the
Supreme Court has recognized a right or "zone" of privacy which is
deemed "fundamental" and, therefore, protected under the Constitution."' The Court has construed "fundamental" rights to include

personal liberties "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental."'1 4 The Supreme Court has

determined that where a state law appears to interfere with a funda111. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
112.

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (noting that a line of decisions going

back as far as the 19th century have developed the right of privacy).
113. Id.; see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (noting that "[i]f the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1969) (noting that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance" and that "various
guarantees create zones of privacy"); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (referring to
the Fourth Amendment as creating a "right to privacy, no less important than any other right
carefully and particularly reserved to the people."); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (invalidating Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act and finding that
"[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.");

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that an Oregon law requiring children to attend public schools interfered "with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting that liberty "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of an individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, to establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.").
114. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487 (1965); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937) (defining fundamental rights as rights that are "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.").
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mental right, a strict scrutiny test must be applied by the court and
the state must show that the conflicting law promotes a compelling
state interest.115 Furthermore, under the strict scrutiny test, the Supreme Court has required that legislative enactments be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interest at issue L6
The Supreme Court has expanded the scope of the fundamental
right of privacy on a case by case basis. The ever-expanding case law
on the subject reveals that the areas included in the zone of protected privacy include certain activities related to marriage,1 17 procrdation,'1 8 contraception,'1 9 family relationships, 20 and the decision
to bear children.' 2 This "zone of privacy" has also been extended to
include personal decisions related to a variety of health issues.' 2 2 An
analysis of the case law developing the zone of privacy as it relates to
health-related issues provides a logical basis for arguing that the
fundamental right of privacy should encompass, under certain limited circumstances, a terminal patient's election to obtain a drug
which has not met the rigid safety and effectiveness testing requirements of the FDCA.
A series of cases has focused on the right of privacy as it relates
115. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155; see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 496-97 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (finding the right of marital privacy to be fundamental and finding a statute forbidding the use of contraceptives as violating that right because it was not necessary for the
fulfillment of a compelling state objective); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (noting
that "[w]here there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail
only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling."); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. at 541 (arguing that strict scrutiny of the classification made by a state in a sterilization
law is essential).
116. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 498 (1983) (noting specifically that "legislative enactments must be
narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interest at stake.").
117. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (finding a Virginia statutory scheme
preventing marriages between persons solely on the basis of race to be in violation of the right
of privacy).
118. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (finding an Oklahoma statute providing for the forced sterilization of habitual criminals to be in violation of the right of
privacy).
119. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454, 460, 463-65 (1972) (finding unconstitutional a state statute banning distribution of contraceptives to unmarried couples).
120. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (upholding as constitutional
a law prohibiting minors from selling newspapers, magazines, etc., in the streets or public
places despite recognizing a right of individuals to rear children in their own interest pursuant
to a constitutionally protected right of privacy).
121. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that the right of personal
privacy includes a woman's right to elect to have an abortion under limited circumstances).
122. See infra notes 123-48 and accompanying text.
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to medical decisions. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,23 the United
States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a person could
refuse to comply with a regulation mandating that adults be vaccinated for smallpox. In upholding the constitutionality of the regulation, the Court held that although an individual has an inherent
right to care for his own body and health, the state interest in eradicating the smallpox epidemic outweighed the individual's right to re1 24
fuse treatment.
Other cases have focused on the fundamental right of an individual to refuse medical treatment on religious grounds. For instance, in In re President and Directors of Georgetown College,
Inc., 2 5 a Jehovah's Witness refused a life-saving blood transfusion
on religious grounds. In that case, the court refused to allow the woman to forego the necessary treatment, focusing on the fact that she
was responsible for a young child. 126
However, in similar challenges based on religious grounds, other
courts have recognized the fundamental right to refuse treatment
and have upheld the patient's decision to refuse necessary medical
treatment where the patient was deemed competent and did not have
dependent minor children. 12 7 In each of these cases, the controlling
factor has been whether the patient refusing treatment was a competent adult making an informed decision, and whether the patient had
minor children who might become wards of the state. 2 " Read in
conjunction, these cases indicate that the decision to forego necessary medical treatment is a fundamental right which may only be
outweighed by a compelling state interest, such as a States' interest
123.

197 U.S. 11 (1905).

124. Id. at 26.

125.

331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).

126.

Id.

127. See, e.g., In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (allowing a patient who was competent and childless to reject necessary blood transfusions); Aste
v. Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) (allowing a patient to refuse a necessary
blood transfusion on religious grounds); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d

705 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (upholding patient's right to refuse a blood transfusion).
128. The case law indicates that the courts are reluctant to allow a parent to refuse
necessary medical care for his/her child on religious grounds. See, e.g., People v. Labrenz, 411
Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952) (finding that a child whose parents refused to permit a blood
transfusion on religious grounds was a neglected child where the child would almost certainly

die or be mentally impaired for life without the necessary transfusion); Jehovah's Witnesses v.
King County Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278 F. Supp. 488, 506 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (holding that
Washington statute empowering superior court judges to declare children dependent for purposes of authorizing blood transfusions of children against the express objections of parents
was not invalid under the U.S. Constitution).
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in safeguarding the best interests of minors.
In a more recent decision, the Supreme Court of the State of
New Jersey extended the right of privacy to encompass the right of
an individual to refuse necessary life support. In In re Quinlan,'2 9
the father of a 22 year-old woman in a comatose, vegetative state,
with no chance of recovery, sought a court order to appoint him as
his daughter's guardian with the power to request the disconnection
of all life-support systems artificially sustaining his daughter's life.
The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the right of privacy encompasses an individual's decision to refuse treatment, and held that
the right to refuse treatment in a situation where there is no chance
to recover to a cognitive state clearly outweighs the state's interest in
sustaining the life of the patient. 130 The court emphasized that "the
State's interest weakens and the individual's right of privacy grows
as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims."1 3
To date, the Supreme Court has not determined whether the
right of privacy should be extended to include the right to gain access to necessary unapproved treatment. In United States v. Rutherford, neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court addressed
the District Court's ruling which determined that by denying the
class of terminal cancer patients access to an unapproved drug, the
132
FDA had violated a constitutional right of privacy.
However, several state courts have addressed this issue, with
1 3 the Supreme Court of
differing results. In People v. Privitera,
California refused to recognize the decision to obtain an unapproved
drug as a fundamental right. In upholding the constitutionality of a
state statute forbidding the introduction into interstate commerce of
any unapproved new drug, the court ruled that the decision to obtain
an unapproved drug is not fundamental and, therefore, should be reviewed under a rational basis test rather than a compelling state interest test.' In Privitera,as in most constitutional challenges to the
rigid new drug approval standards, the defendant relied on the
129.

70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub. nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.

922 (1976).
130.
131.
132.
aftd, 582
133.
(1979).
134.

Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
Id.
See Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1301 (W.D. Okla. 1977),
F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949
Id. at 700, 591 P.2d at 922, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
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United State Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade,3 5 which extended the right of privacy to the right of a woman to elect to have
an abortion. However, the court in Privitera argued that the ruling
in Roe related to the area of procreation and, for this reason, should
not be extended to include the right to obtain unapproved treatment.' The California Supreme Court noted that the right of privacy is not absolute and that "a State may properly assert important
interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards,
and in protecting potential life.' 137 Consequently, the court held that
the statute proscribing the sale or delivery of a drug which had not
been approved by the designated federal agency bore a rational relationship to the achievement of a legitimate state interests in the
health and safety of its citizens. 38
However, in Suenram v. Society of the Valley Hospital, 39 the
Superior Court of New Jersey followed a different analysis, and held
that the right of an elderly terminally-ill cancer patient to choose or
reject a cancer treatment on the advice of a licensed physician was a
fundamental right, whether or not the drug was approved by the
state or the hospital in which it was sought to be administered.' 4 0
The court relied on Canterbury v. Spence,"4 ' which, in developing
theneed for informed consent, emphasized that "[t]he root premise
is the concept, fundamental in American jurisprudence, that every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done to his own body." In recognizing the fundamental
right of a patient to choose unapproved treatment, the court in
Suenram noted that it was not dealing with "a naive patient [who]
has been led away from the more effective 'orthodox' treatments."' 4 2
On the contrary, the court noted that the patient seeking access to
the unapproved cancer drug had already turned to chemotherapy
and all other conventional treatments available, and was turning to
the unapproved drug, laetrile, as a last resort.'43 In recognizing the
135.

See, e.g., Comment, supra note 69, at 706 (arguing that the Roe v. Wade decision

suggests that a person has a fundamental right to undergo un approved treatment when the
state's denial of such treatment severely affects the lifestyle of that individual).

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d at 700, 591 P.2d at 922, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
See Privitera,23 Cal. 3d at 700, 591 P.2d at 922, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
155 N.J. Super. 593, 383 A.2d 143 (1977).
Id. at 602, 383 A.2d at 148.
464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of New York

Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).

142. Suenram, 155 N.J. Super. at 596, 383 A.2d at 146.
143. Id.
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patient's fundamental right to elect the unapproved drug, the court
noted that "[w]here a person is terminally ill . . .and unresponsive
1 44
to other treatments, the public harm is considerably reduced."
The court also noted that "[t] he Constitutions of the Nation and this
State are irrevocably committed to the principle that individuals
must be given the maximum latitude in determining their own
1 45
destiny."
In fact, in Privitera, the California Supreme Court explicitly
noted that the case had to be distinguished from the United States
District Court's decision in United States v. Rutherford, which held
that the right to choose unapproved treatment was a fundamental
right, since the individuals seeking access to unapproved drugs in the
California case were not terminally ill.1 46 Furthermore, in a strong
dissent in Privitera,Judge Byrd argued that the right of a patient to
choose or reject treatment, whether orthodox or unorthodox, is a
fundamental right, incident to the right of privacy, which may only
be overcome by a compelling state interest.1 47 Noting that cancer is
a disease whose causes and treatments continue to baffle the medical
community, Judge Byrd argued that "[s]o long as there is no clear
evidence that laetrile is unsafe to the user, . . . each individual patient has the right to obtain the substance from a licensed physician
1 48
who feels it appropriate to prescribe it to him.
Based on the cases developing the right of privacy as it relates
144.

Id. (citing Carnohan v. United States, No. 77-0010-GT Civ. (S.D. Cal. 1977)). In

Carnohan, the plaintiff was a terminal cancer patient who sought to enjoin the FDA from
interfering with his importation or interstate shipment of laetrile for his personal use. Id. In
balancing its power to issue injunctive relief against the possible harm to the public by allowing the weakening of laws aimed at preventing the victimization of desperate cancer pa-

tients, the court held that "where a person is terminally ill with cancer and unresponsive to
other treatments, the public harm is considerably reduced." Id.
145. Id. at 598, 383 A.2d at 146.
146. See Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d at 703, 591 P.2d at 925, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 437 (stating
that "the [d]efendants can take no comfort in the court of appeals decision [in Rutherford],

for, unlike Rutherford, this case is not an action on behalf of the class of terminally-il cancer
patients. Whatever can be said in favor of permitting 'terminal' cancer patients access to lae-

trile, there is no indication in the record that defendants sought to restrict their activities to
that class when prescribing, distributing and administering lactrile.").
147. Id. at 705, 591 P.2d at 927, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 439 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). Judge

Bird argued that "[c]ancer is a disease with potentially fatal consequences; this makes the
choice of treatment one of the more important decisions a person may ever make, touching
intimately on his or her being. For this reason, I believe the right of privacy, under both the
state and federal Constitutions, prevents the state from interfering with a person's choice of

treatment on the sole grounds that the person has chosen a treatment that the state considers
'ineffective.'" Id.
148.

Id.
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to decisions concerning health, the fundamental right of privacy
should be logically extended to the right of a terminal patient with
no approved treatment alternatives to elect to use an unapproved experimental drug. It is illogical to recognize the fundamental right of
a patient to refuse necessary medical treatment and the fundamental
right of a patient to refuse necessary life-sustaining mechanisms,
while refusing to recognize the fundamental right of a terminal patient with no approved treatment alternatives to elect to use an unapproved experimental drug. As Justice Douglas stated in his concurring opinion in Doe v. Bolton, the right of privacy encompasses
"the freedom to care for one's own health or person, freedom from
bodily restraint or compulsion ....,,149 Accordingly, the fundamental right of privacy should encompass the right of a terminally-ill
individual to choose unapproved experimental treatment.
However, even if the decision to elect unapproved treatment is
deemed a fundamental right, its exercise may nevertheless be infringed by a compelling state interest.1 50 Furthermore, any legislative enactment must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate interest at stake. 151 Where the state fails to show either that it
has a compelling state interest or that the statute is narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest, the statute will be struck
down as unconstitutional. 152 Thus, once the courts recognize that the
decision to obtain necessary medical treatment is a fundamental
right, only a compelling state interest would justify the infringement
of that right. Moreover, to withstand a constititutional challenge, the
statute proscribing access to unapproved drugs-i.e. the FDCA,
must be narrowly drawn to serve only that compelling interest.
It is well settled that the state has an interest in promoting the
health, safety and welfare of its citizens. 53 It is equally well estab149. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas J.,
concurring) (finding that
three procedural conditions in a Georgia abortion statute were unconstitutional and noting that
the freedom to care for one's own health comes within the meaning of the term "liberty" as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment).
150. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (outlining the requirements under the
strict scrutiny test).
151. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
1 52. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 213 (1973); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 487 (1969).
153. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (noting that "[a] state may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential
life."); see also Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (noting
that some regulations, "those justified by important state health objectives, are permissible
even in the first trimester [of pregnancy]"); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (recog-
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lished that the main objective of the FDCA is to protect the public
from the dangers of unsafe and ineffective drugs. 5 However, if
courts recognize that the decision to elect an unapproved treatment
is a fundamental right, the FDCA canfiot withstand a constitutional
challenge unless it can show that: (1) the government has a compelling interest in protecting terminal AIDS patients from the dangers
associated with experimental drugs; and (2) the FDCA is narrowly
drawn to protect only that compelling interest.
While the federal and state governments may have a compelling
interest in protecting non-terminal patients or terminal patients with
approved treatment alternatives from choosing unapproved drugs
over proven effective alternatives, this interest quickly loses force
when confronted with a person with AIDS who cannot tolerate AZT
and who cannot gain access to an experimental drug clinical trial. As
the Supreme Court of New Jersey emphasized in In re Quinlan, "the
State's interest [in the life of a patient] weakens and the individual's
right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and
the prognosis dims."' 55 The state's interest in the life of a terminal
patient with AIDS similarly weakens, especially where the patient
cannot tolerate the only approved drug, AZT, and cannot gain access to any traditional clinical trials. While the States may have a
compelling interest in protecting even terminal patients against unsafe drugs, the States do not have a compelling interest in protecting
a terminal AIDS patient who has no approved treatment alternatives
from gaining access to a drug which has not completed the FDCA's
effectiveness testing. Since allowing the individual to elect a drug
which may be ineffective will not result in his foregoing a proven
effective alternative, the State should not have a compelling interest
in protecting the patient from such an unproven alternative.
Moreover, even if the state's interest in protecting terminal
AIDS patients from unproven remedies is deemed to be compelling,
the FDCA's rigid safety and effectiveness testing criteria may still
be unconstitutional if they are not narrowly drawn to serve only the
State's compelling interest at stake.' 56 For instance, in Roe v. Wade,
nizing the existence of state police powers related to the safety, health, morals, and general
welfare of the public).
154. See supra notes 29-61 and accompanying text (describing the legislative intent in
protecting the health and safety of the public through the new drug testing requirements of the
FDCA).
155. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied sub nom.
Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
156. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
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the United States Supreme Court held that there was no compelling
state interest in proscribing a patient's fundamental right to elect an
abortion until the completion of the first trimester of pregnancy
when the health and safety risks to the mother and fetus were compelling enough to warrant state regulation. 157 Accordingly, the Court
struck down the Texas abortion statute for overbreadth since it
failed to make any distinctions between abortions performed early in
pregnancy when there was no compelling state interest in intervention, and those performed later when the state's interest in regulating abortions became compelling.1 58
Applying this same approach to the issue of unapproved experimental treatment for persons with AIDS, the restrictions imposed by
the FDCA and similar state provisions could be deemed overly broad
and unconstitutional. The federal and state governments can assert a
plausible argument that they have a compelling interest in protecting
all individuals against gaining access to drugs which have not been
proven to be safe. 5 ' Furthermore, the federal and state governments
may have a compelling interest in protecting non-terminal patients
and terminal patients with approved treatment alternatives from
electing drugs which have not been proven as effective over approved
methods.160 However, the state's interest in protecting individuals
against ineffective drugs quickly fades when confronted by the limited class of AIDS patients who cannot tolerate the only approved
drug, AZT, and who do not have any access to other experimental
alternatives. 161 Under these circumstances, the patient's right to obtain a safe, but potentially ineffective drug, which may be a last
chance of hope, clearly outweighs any competing interests. Consequently, the experimental drug regulations should be modified so as
to preserve the state's interest in protecting all individuals against
unsafe and potentially lethal drugs without interfering with the
choice of a patient with no treatment alternatives to gain access to a
drug which may or may not be effective in treating his illness.
To date, the Supreme Court has not determined whether a ter157. Id. at 163-64.
158. Id. at 164.
159. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text (describing states' interest in protecting public, including terminal patients, against unsafe drugs).
160. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text (describing states' interest in protecting public against ineffective drugs where effective alternatives are available).
161. See supra notes 100.05 and accompanying text (arguing that states do not have a
compelling interest in protecting terminal patients against ineffective drugs where there are no
other effective alternatives available).
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minal patient has a fundamental right to obtain unapproved treatment. However, the recent FDA regulatory enactments and new proposals for accelerating distribution of experimental drugs may
suggest a recognition on the part of the government, as well as advocates of persons with terminal illnesses, of the need to preserve the
state's interest in protecting public health while at the same time
respecting the right of a patient with no treatment alternatives to
elect experimental treatment whose efficacy has not been fully
shown.
V.

RECENT LIBERALIZATION OF THE PROCESS FOR DISTRIBUTING
EXPERIMENTAL DRUGS

While the United States Supreme Court has yet to formally
recognize a fundamental right of access to necessary unapproved
treatment, the FDA appears to have recognized the need to loosen
the rigid drug approval requirements for experimental drugs for certain life-threatening illnesses, such as AIDS, for which there are few
if any approved treatment alternatives."8 2 In response to intense pressure from advocates of persons with AIDS, the FDA is beginning to
make radical changes in the procedures for distributing experimental
drugs. 6 These new changes to the FDCA safety and effectiveness
requirements are encouraging, because they more narrowly tailor the
FDCA to promote the government's compelling interest in protecting
the health and safety of terminal patients, while at the same time
respecting the decision of terminal patients with no therapeutic alternatives to obtain necessary experimental treatment.
The traditional method of drug distribution in the United States
is a slow and tedious process." 4 A sponsor of an investigational drug
who intends to conduct clinical investigations is required to submit
162. See infra notes 176-203 and accompanying text.

163. Id.
164. See Waters, supra note 96, at 7-9 (explaining that under the traditional clinical

testing requirements of the FDCA, the average time it took a new drug to go to the market
was 7-10 years). In fact, a major controversy has recently developed concerning the reporting
of new AIDS breakthroughs. Medical experts discovered that treatment with steroid hormones
can halve the death rate from the pneumonia that is the leading killer of people with AIDS.
However, the government agency that had convened a panel of experts to conduct the study
delayed more than five months before notifying AIDS doctors of their findings. The delay was
believed to be due in part to a concern that early notification might jeopardize the publication
of the panel's conclusions in the New England Journal of Medicine. The delay in reporting the
AIDS therapy finding has infuriated many advocates of persons with AIDS. See Kolata, News
of AIDS Therapy Gain Delayed Five Months By Agency, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1990, at Al,
A17.
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an investigational new drug (IND) application to the FDA.16 5 Once
the proper application is submitted, the sponsor is required to clinically investigate the untested drug using a three-phase clinical testing scheme.166 During the first phase, scientists evaluate the metabo-

lism and pharmacological actions of the drug, determine the side
effects associated with increasing dosage of the drug, and attempt 167
to
gain some preliminary information on the drug's effectiveness.
Thus, phase one concentrates on determining the safety of the investigational new drug.168
In phase two, controlled clinical studies are conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug for a particular disease and to determine the short-term side effects of the drug.1 69 Thus, phase two provides additional safety assurances, but places greater emphasis on
determining the drug's effectiveness. 7 0
165.

21 C.F.R. § 312.20 (1989). This section states that:
(a) A sponsor shall submit an IND to FDA if the sponsor intends to conduct a
clinical investigation with an investigational new drug that is subject to § 312.2(a).
(b) A sponsor shall not begin a clinical investigation subject to § 312.2(a) until
the investigation is subject to an IND which is in effect in accordance with
§ 312.40.

Id.
166. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (1989). This section states: "An IND may be submitted for one
or more phases of an investigation. The clinical investigation of a previously untested drug is
generally divided into three phases. Although in general the phases are conducted sequentially,
they may overlap." Id.
167. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(1)(1989). This section states:
(a) Phase 1. (1) Phase I includes the initial introduction of an investigational new
drug into humans. Phase 1 studies are typically closely monitored and may be conducted in patients or normal volunteer subjects. These studies are designed to determine the metabolism and pharmacological actions of the drug in humans, the side
effects associated with-increasing doses, and, if possible, to gain early evidence on
effectiveness. During Phase 1, sufficient information about the drug's
pharmacokinetics and pharmocological effects should be obtained to permit the design of well-controlled, scientifically valid Phase 2 studies, The total number of subjects and patients included in Phase 1 studies varieG with the drug, but is generally
in the range of 20 to 80.
Id.
168. Id.
169. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b)(1989). This section provides:
(b) Phase 2. Phase 2 includes the controlled clinical studies conducted to evaluate
the effectiveness of the drug for a particular indication or indications in patients
with the disease or condition under study and to determine the common short-term
side effects and risks associated with the drug. Phase 2 studies are typically well
controlled, closely monitored, and conducted in a relatively small number of patients, usually involving no more than several hundred subjects.
Id.
170. Id.
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Phase three consists of expanded controlled and uncontrolled
studies which are intended to determine the effectiveness
and safety
17 1
as well as the relative risk/benefit ratio of the drug.
Under the traditional three-tiered system, the average time it
takes a drug to move from the test tube to the drug store shelf has
been anywhere from seven to ten years. 17 2 However, in response to
the lack of alternatives for the treatment of AIDS,17 3 the FDA has
recently made fundamental changes in the way it allows distribution
of drugs for persons with terminal illnesses and has begun to take
greater chances than ever before.17 4 First, the FDA allowed the drug
AZT to run through the clinical testing process in less than two
years, as opposed to the traditional seven to ten year process.1 75
Next, the FDA has recently enacted regulations which allow some
patients with serious or life-threatening illnesses to obtain experimental drugs before clinical trials have determined their effectiveness for their intended uses. 7
In May of 1987, the FDA implemented the Treatment Investigational New Drug (IND) Program, an expanded access program
which allows doctors to prescribe experimental drugs to their patients as if the patients were enrolled in traditional clinical trials.17
171.

21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c)(1989). This section states:

(c) Phase 3. Phase 3 studies are expanded controlled and uncontrolled trials. They
are performed after preliminary evidence suggesting effectiveness of the drug has

been obtained, and are intended to gather the additional information about the effectiveness and safety that is needed to evaluate the overall benefit-risk relationship
of the drug and to provide an adequate basis for physician labeling. Phase 3 studies
usually include from several hundred to several thousand subjects.

Id.
172. See Hilts, supra note 14, at Al.

173. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text (discussing the scarcity of therapeutic
alternatives for persons with AIDS).
174. See Levine, Has AIDS Changed The Ethics Of Human Subjects Research?, 16
LAW. MED. & HEALTHCARE 167, 171 (1988) (emphasizing that AIDS has become a catalyst
for rapid change in the system of testing and approving AIDS drugs).
175. See Norris, The FDA's AIDS Program, 12 NovA L. R.v. 1103, 1107 (1988) (defending the F.D.A.'s method in rapidly approving the drugs); see also Hilts, supra note 14, at
Al, col. 2 (noting that other drugs which have been pushed through the FDA drug approval

system in record time include a drug to treat the deadly pneumonia which attacks AIDS patients and another for the blindness which sometimes afflicts persons with AIDS).
176. See E. NIcHoLs, supra note 2, at 210 (discussing how the desire to help desperately
ill individuals afflicted with AIDS without access to traditional clinical trials was one of the

factors behind the FDA's decision to enact procedures for the early release of certain experimental drugs).
177. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a) (1989). This section states:

(a) General. A drug that is not approved for marketing may be under clinical investigation for a serious or immediately life-threatening disease or condition in patients
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The purpose behind the new regulatory enactment was to streamline
promising experimental drugs to desperately ill individuals as early
in the drug approval process as possible and, through this mechanism, to obtain additional clinical data on the drug's safety and effectiveness.1 7 The FDA believed that the new regulation would balance the need to adequately investigate experimental treatment with
the need to meet the public's demand for promising investigational
remedies.179 Moreover, by promulgating detailed regulations restricting access to experimental drugs under the program, the FDA aimed
at balancing the states' interest in protecting the health and safety of
its citizens while at the same time respecting the health needs of
terminal patients. 18 0
The FDA established specific criteria for use of a treatment
IND. First, the drug sought through the treatment IND must be
intended to treat a serious or immediately life-threatening illness.18 1
Second, there must be no comparable drug or therapy available to
treat that stage of the illness. 82 Third, the drug must have completed, or be in the process of completing, an investigation under a
for whom no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or other therapy is available. During the clinical investigation of the drug, it may be appropriate to use the
drug in the treatment of patients not in the clinical trials, in accordance with a
treatment protocol or treatment IND ....
Id.
178. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a) (1989) (stating that "[tihe purpose of this section is to
facilitate the availability of promising new drugs to desperately ill patients as early in the drug
development process as possible, before general marketing begins, and to obtain additional
data on the drug's safety and effectiveness."); see also 52 Fed. Reg. 8850 (1987) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312) (proposed March 19, 1987) (noting that the new procedures were
intended to facilitate the availability of promising new drugs to patients with life-threatening
or other serious diseases for which no satisfactory alternatives exist, including acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)).
179. See 52 Fed Reg. 8851 (1987) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312) (proposed March
19, 1987).
180. Id.
181. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b) (1989). This section states:
(b) Criteria. (1) FDA shall permit an investigational drug to be used for treatment
use under a treatment protocol or treatment IND if:
(i) The drug is intended to treat a serious or immediately life-threatening
disease;
(ii) There is no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or therapy available
to treat that stage of the disease in the intended patient population;
(iii) The drug is under investigation in a controlled clinical trial, under an IND
in effect for the trial or all cincial trials have been completed; and
(iv) The sponsor of the controlled clinical trial is actively pursuing marketing
approval of the investigational drug with due diligence.
Id.
182. Id.
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controlled clinical trial. 183 Finally, the sponsor of the clinical trial
must be actively and diligently pursuing marketing approval for the
investigational drug. 8 4
The treatment IND program is a step in the right direction. The
program appears to balance the individual's right to obtain experimental treatment with the states' interest in safeguarding terminal
patients against untested alternatives. Moreover, the treatment IND
regulations appear to tailor more narrowly the FDCA, recognizing
that the state has less of a compelling interest in protecting terminal
patients with no treatment alternatives from obtaining drugs which
have not completely satisfied the traditional clinical testing requirements for safety and efficacy.
Unfortunately, the new treatment IND program has failed to
meet the urgent needs of patients with AIDS in several respects.
Under the treatment IND program, the Commissioner of the FDA is
authorized to reject a request for treatment use of a drug for different reasons depending on whether the drug is to be used for a severely debilitating 18 5 or life-threatening illness. 8 ' If an experimental
drug is to be used to treat a serious illness, the Commissioner may
reject the treatment IND application if it is determined that there is
insufficient evidence of safety and effectiveness to support the treatment use of the drug. 87 If the drug is intended to treat an immediately life-threatening illness, the Commissioner may reject the treatment IND application if the scientific evidence fails to show that the
drug may be effective for its intended use or fails to show that the
drug would not expose the patient to an unreasonable and significantly additional risk of injury. 88 Thus, in either situation, the treatment IND regulations still require a rigid clinical showing of both
safety and effectiveness before the treatment IND would be
granted. 189 As a result, critics have argued that by continuing to re183. Id.
184. Id.
185. The regulations define a severely debilitating illness as a disease or a condition that
causes major irreversible morbidity. 21 C.F.R. § 312.81(b) (1989).
186. The regulations define "immediately life-threatening" to mean "a stage of a disease
in which there is a reasonable likelihood that death will occur within a matter of months or in
which premature death is likely without early treatment." 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(3)(ii)

(1989).
187. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(2) (1989).
188. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(3) (1989).
189. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (1989). This section provides that:
In the case of a serious disease, a drug ordinarily may be made available for treatment use under this section during Phase 3 investigations or after all clinical trials
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quire that the experimental drugs meet such rigid safety and effectiveness criteria, the treatment IND has failed to live up to its prom-

ise of providing experimental drugs to terminal patients with no
treatment alternatives at the earliest point in the drug process as

possible.19 0 Moreover, advocates of persons with AIDS have noted

that the treatment IND program has been underutilized by both

drug companies and private physicians. 91
However, the urgency and magnitude of the AIDS pandemic

has caused researchers to closely examine the drug evaluation pro-

cess in hopes of developing new ways to streamline necessary experimental treatment without compromising public safety and health.1 92
One proposal currently being discussed by leaders of the public and
private health sectors has the potential to allow access to promising

drugs for the treatment of AIDS and other terminal illnesses at an
earlier point in the traditional clinical testing process than ever
before.' 93 Under the proposed "parallel track"' 94 system, patients
who do not qualify for, or have access to, experimental drug clinical
trials and who have no approved therapeutic options would be eligible to receive certain experimental drugs as soon as the drugs enter
clinical trials. 95 Another option currently being discussed is to conduct huge national drug trials, rather than the limited trials which
have been completed; however, in appropriate circumstances, a drug may be made
available for treatment use during Phase 2. In the case of an immediately lifethreatening disease, a drug may be made available for treatment use under this
section earlier than Phase 3, but ordinarily not earlier than Phase 2.
Id.
190. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 174, at 171 (noting that the Treatment IND mechanism has failed to live up to its promise).
191. Id. (emphasizing that during the treatment IND mechanism's first year in operation, only one drug for the treatment of AIDS has been approved for early distribution under
the program, while other promising AIDS drugs were rejected by the FDA).
192. See Statement By Anthony S. Fauci, M.D., Director, National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases, October 5, 1989 (transcript on file at Hofstra Law Review) (noting
that "[w]e are in a period of re-examination of some of the traditional concepts of clinical
research" and that "[a] consensus is developing around the need for greater flexibility and
innovation in our search for new therapies, and the need to expand access to experimental
drugs to larger numbers of HIV-infected people, particularly to those who have been underrepresented in clinical trials.").
193. See National Inst. of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, Where Do AIDS Drugs
Come From? (on fie at Hofstra Law Review) (discussing latest proposals to streamline access
to experimental treatment) [hereinafter NIAID, AIDS Drugs].
194. The "parallel track" system was first proposed by Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, Director
of the National Inst. of Allery and Infectious Diseases, at a medical meeting held in San
Francisco in June 1989. See National Inst. of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, Update on
ParallelTrack Proposal,NIAID AIDS AGENDA 5 (July 1989).
195. See NIAID, AIDS Drugs, supra note 193, at 9.
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are currently used in studying the safety and effectiveness of new
drugs.19 Under this new clinical trial approach, trials of experimental drugs could include 10,000 to 20,000, patients, in contrast to
traditional trials, which typically include 1,000 patients at most and
exclude individuals who do not fall into specific age groups or who
have other conditions which might complicate the study.1 9 7 Advocates of this new drug trial system point out these types of large
studies are currently being used with a great deal of success in Europe to test treatments in heart disease patients.198 Both proposals
appear to recognize the need to shift the balance of risk to the terminally ill patient and his physician when dealing with the decision to
choose an unapproved method of treatment. 99
Each of the two new proposals carries with it potential problems
which will need to be worked out before implementation.200 More
importantly, however, each symbolizes the recognition of the need to
respect the right of a desperately ill individual to elect to obtain necessary experimental medical treatment. Additionally, the two proposals preserve the states' compelling interest in protecting non-terminal patients and terminal patients with approved treatment
alternatives from relying upon unapproved therapeutic alternatives.
Furthermore, both proposals would more narrowly tailor the FDCA
to serve only the states' compelling interest by emphasizing the need
to relax the traditional drug distribution requirements when dealing
with terminal patients who have no approved medical alternatives.
While the FDA has not yet formally adopted either of the new
proposals, a recent unprecedented move by the Administration may
indicate that adoption of either plan could soon be underway. In
September 1989, the FDA announced that it would release an exper196. See Kolata, Radical Change Urged in Testing of AIDS Drugs, N.Y. Times, Mar.
26, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (noting that the new plan could give quicker results that better reflect
what would happen if a given drug was marketed to a diverse population of people with
AIDS).
197. Id. at B8, col. 2.

198. Id.
199. See id. (noting that "many Federal health experts and advocates for people with
AIDS say [traditional trials] progress too slowly because it takes too long to recruit the perfect
patient population. They also say that these studies exclude too many patients and produce
results that do not always apply to the diverse group of patients who will take a drug after it is

licensed and marketed.").
200.

For example, some experts have raised concerns that the new proposal for larger

national drug trials might tie up so many AIDS patients in these new trials that when a new
drug came along there would be too few patients left to try out the new drug in traditional

clinical trials. They fear that this could lead to the problem of "a mediocre drug locking out a
spectacular drug." See id.
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imental drug for the treatment of AIDS, DDI,2 10 through the treatment IND program after completion of Phase I testing- an earlier
stage in the clinical testing process than ever before.20 2 The FDA's
action received great praise from persons with AIDS and many leaders in the health field as a positive step towards meeting the special
medical needs of the terminally-ill. °3 Formal adoption of the new
proposals for streamlined experimental drug distribution may be the
next logical step towards assuring terminal AIDS patients with no
treatment alternatives the right to obtain necessary unapproved
treatment.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The debate over the easing of restrictions on access to unapproved drugs for terminal patients will likely continue for years to
come as more and more persons are diagnosed with the deadly syndrome. AIDS activists will undoubtedly continue to pressure the government to loosen the rigid restrictions which obstruct the ability of
persons with AIDS and other terminal illnesses from obtaining drugs
with the potential to cure or alleviate some of the pain and suffering
associated with their illnesses. Persons with AIDS will likely look to
the courts to challenge the stringent regulations which stand in the
way of experimental drug accessibility. The courts should recognize
201. DDI, a chemical cousin of AZT, is a nucleoside analog, a false building block of
DNA, that gets into the HIV virus' genetic material and blocks its duplication. Scientists
believe that the drug may be useful to the 40% of AIDS patients who are unable to tolerate
AZT due to its serious side effects. See Chase, AIDS Drug DDI to Be Distributed Widely,
Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1989, at B2, col. 1; see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
HHS NEWs, Sept. 28, 1989 (announcing the FDA and NIH plan to allow the drug's sponsor,
Bristol-Myers, to distribute DDI through the treatment IND program after the drug had only
completed Phase 1 clinical testing).
202. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SaRvs.. HHS NEWS, Sept. 28, 1989.
203. Id. (discussing the reactions of advocates of persons with AIDS to the new regulatory change); see also Chase, supranote 201, at B2, col. 3 (discussing the positive reactions of
persons with AIDS and their advocates to the easing of restrictions on experimental drug distribution, as well as the more cautious approach taken by some medical professionals regarding the plan). Note that the DDI expanded access plan is very different from the proposal for
national trials in that while the expanded access program is intended to collect some information on the response of patients using the new drugs, it is not designed to assess the drug's
safety and efffectiveness but rather is designed to provide emergency access to patients who
have exhausted standard therapies and cannot gain access to traditional clinical trials. The
national trial proposal, on the other hand, is designed to gather information on new drugs by
simply observing the symptoms of patients and noting whether they are getting better or
worse. Thus, the national trials would not be involved in the tremendous amount of datakeeping which often slows down the traditional clinical testing method. See Kolata, supra note
196, at B8, col. 1.
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that just as the right to refuse necessary medical treatment has been
deemed a fundamental right under limited circumstances, the right
to obtain necessary medical treatment should also be deemed a fundamental right incident to the right of privacy. Once the fundamental right to obtain necessary treatment is recognized, the courts
should find that while the Federal and State governments do have a
compelling interest in protecting non-terminal individuals and terminal patients with treatment alternatives against unapproved drugs,
the governments do not have a compelling interest in protecting terminal patients with no treatment alternatives from electing to use a
drug, while under the supervision of a licensed physician, which has
not met the rigid safety and effectiveness testing requirements of the
FDCA. The treatment IND program and new early distribution proposals symbolize a positive movement towards balancing the need to
assure that patients' lives are not jeopardized as a result of unsafe
-medical treatment with the need to provide desperately ill individuals with some form of hope. Such hope is sometimes all an AIDS
patient has to hold on to.
Jon Scott Batterman
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